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Introduction 
For at least four centuries financial crises have been a regular feature of Western 
capitalist economics.   Financial crises are defined by a liquidation of credit and a decrease in 
stock prices resulting from the “forced sale of assets by overindebted firms” (Canova 110).  Can 
a financial crisis occur in a system with no interest rates?  In this paper, I will test the possibility 
that a financial crisis can occur under the tenets of Islamic finance, which eschews interest.  
First, I will outline the anatomy and characteristics of a classical Western financial crisis, the 
Panic of 1907.  This will be our Western paradigm of a financial crisis.  Then, I will examine the 
possibility of such a financial crisis occurring under the tenets of Islamic finance.  I will provide 
an overview of the Islamic finance system, elaborating on the prohibition of interest (riba) and 
focusing on the profit making mechanisms of deferred sales contracts and profit-and-loss sharing 
contracts.  I will use the cases of financial crises and the collapse of real estate bubbles in Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates and Qatar.  By examining the cases Dubai and Qatar, I will prove that a 
financial crisis can occur under a system of Islamic finance and that the financial regulations of a 
central banking mechanism prevent or mitigate the occurrence of a financial crisis.   
Western Crisis Anatomy 
A financial crisis occurs at the peak of economic prosperity during the business cycle, 
“followed by a period of liquidation in which business, commodity and securities prices 
decrease” (Johnson 454).  High business speculation has increased the frequency and severity of 
financial crises in developed economies (Sprague 353-4).  Mitchell, Fisher, Minsky, and 
Kindleberger argue that financial crises are endogenous and occur at the expansion phase of the 
business cycle (Canova 105).  As a result, the economy weakens toward the end of expansion 
because firms have difficulty paying their debts due to decreasing business profits. Canova 
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states: “firms rely on debt to finance capital investments on speculative schemes to increase 
expected profits; and there exist excessively optimistic expectations about the future of the 
economy” (Canova 105).   A financial crisis spreads when there is a decrease in the financial 
environment surrounding several firms.  Low expectations for future profits result in creditors 
reassessing the amount of credit to be issued, refusing in the expansion of additional credit, and 
liquidating of existing outstanding loans.  Firms’ inability to refinance debt leads to asset 
liquidation, contracting business profit and resulting in extensive asset market crashes and 
bankruptcies (Canova 105). 
Often financial crises are associated with panics.  Panics occur when depositors feel that 
a bank’s assets are insufficient to guarantee their claim to their money.  During a bank run many 
of the bank’s depositors simultaneously attempt to withdraw their funds (Allen and Gale 1245). 
Allen and Gale maintain: “A financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or 
all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously” (Allen 
and Gale 1245).  Likewise, Mitchell maintains a panic occurs when credit is liquidated affects 
the weakest sectors of the economy, spreading “unreasonable alarm” as large firms descend into 
bankruptcy (Canova 106).  Moreover, Canova argues, other economists view panics as the result 
of the search for money to pay past debts without sufficient lender’s credit.  Despite variations in 
the definition of a panic, the common theme is the unusual decline “in bank deposits associated 
with a run follows, the appearance of a crisis rather than precedes it” (Canova 106).  In 
conclusion, a bank run occurs after the beginning of a financial crisis, not before.    
There are many other additional factors that play key roles in the anatomy of a financial 
crisis.  During a financial crisis the contracting money supply precipitates the forced liquidation 
of financial assets by banks.  As a result, there is a decrease in the price of assets, high interest 
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rates, made banks insolvent, and decreased confidence in financial system, “transforming a 
stringency into a crisis” (Canova 106).  In addition, Wilson, Sylla, and Jones have examined the 
link between stock markets and financial crises, specifically when a stock market crashes and 
leads to an eventual bank panic and recession.  Specifically, Wilson, Sylla, and Jones’s 
hypothesis argues: “when the bubble bursts or runs against other constraints and when the 
insolvency of those banks that finance the speculation becomes publicly known, the call rate 
skyrockets, security prices tumbles and banks are run” (Canova 107).  In other words, a financial 
crisis occurs when the speculation bubble bursts and the public discovers the extent to which 
financial speculation is occurring, resulting subsequent bank runs and the liquidation of assets.  
This instance leads to the “breakdown of the allocation mechanism of financial capital that 
causes contracts in business activities and leads to recession” (Canova 106).  The disintegration 
of the financial system will subsequently lead to a financial crisis spawned by the insolvency of 
the banking system and its resulting bank runs. 
Post-Keynesian economist, Hyman Minsky characterizes economies has inherently 
unstable and fragile as a result of capitalism (Minsky 5).  He argues that in a capitalist economy, 
there is a threat of an “imminent collapse of asset values and employment and threats of 
accelerating inflation and rampant speculation…if the market mechanism is to function well, we 
must arrange to constrain the uncertainty due to business cycles so that the expectations that 
guided investment can reflect a vision of tranquil process” (Minsky 6).  Additionally, Minsky 
maintains that Western capitalist economies are unstable because of the internal works of our 
economy’s financial structures that are prone to inflation and depression.  Policy makers do not 
realize the flaws of their economy and the fact that they can use institutions and policy to 
assuage an economy’s inherent instability (Minsky 10).  To contend with an economy’s inherent 
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instability, a country’s central bank plays the role of the lender of last resort (Minsky 38).  
Minsky asserts “the lender of last resort stabilizes asset values and financial markets; for 
example the Federal Reserve buys, stands to buy, or accepts collateral financial assets that are 
not marketable” (Minsky 38). The creation of the lender of last resort, or a country’s central 
banking system, is an essential mechanism in the attempt to prevent a financial crisis from 
occurring in a Western capitalist financial system.  
The Financial Crisis of 1907 
The Financial Crisis of 1907 is a paradigm of a typical Western financial crisis, 
beginning in January with the subsequent panic occurring in that October.  Johnson argues that 
the resultant panic is “almost invariably the product of the remediable defects of the credit 
system (Johnson 454).  The financial crisis had effects on the international economy, specifically 
in countries with currency on the gold standard.  The panic only ensued in the United States.  
The foundations of the 1907 crisis were laid beginning in 1897.  During this ten year period there 
was an increase in the supply of gold, expanding the amount of available bank credit.  In 
addition, in gold standard based economies the price of commodities increased about 40 percent 
(Johnson 455).  Between 1897 and 1907, economic prosperity went unmonitored: prices 
increased, the stock market boomed, and bank clearances increased (Johnson 456).  Moreover, 
during this period there was the development and construction of industrial infrastructure and 
South American enterprises, and the “positive destruction of capital in three costly wars” 
(Johnson 457).  As a result of this economic situation, interest rates rose and the prices of first-
class bonds decreased (Johnson 457).  In addition, the investment of capital in corporate 
industries was urged by banks, ultimately leading to the bank’s money becoming stuck in long-
term investments (Johnson 457-8).  Also, the speculative environment of real estate and other 
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industries contributed to the impending financial crisis (Johnson 458).  Johnson argues: “ it 
doubtful if this speculative diversion of loanable funds deserves to be regarded as an important 
antecedent condition of the crisis, yet it was probably a contributing cause” (Johnson 458).  The 
combination of the expanding in banking credit and bank investment, increasing commodity 
prices and interest rates, and the speculative financial climate between 1897 and 1907 set the 
United States economy on the trajectory toward financial crisis.  
Another signal that illustrates the United States’ path toward financial crisis is the decline 
in cash reserves between 1897 and 1907.  During 1897, the cash reserves of commercial banks 
and trust companies made up 18 percent of net liabilities in the United States and by 1907, the 
net liabilities of these cash reserved dropped to 10 percent.  Johnson argues this decrease in the 
ratio of banking reserve is a result of: “the growth of trust company deposits, supporting which 
there was a reserve of barely five per cent” and “the relatively smaller cash reserves kept in the 
country banks, many of these institutions having been tempted by high rates of interest to invest 
heavily in call loans and time paper in New York city” (Johnson 458).  Johnson views this 
situation as increasing evidence that a financial crisis was imminent because bank leading was 
restricted (Johnson 459).  The decrease in cash reserves and the cessation of lending further put 
the United States on the trajectory toward a financial crisis.    
During the period from 1903 to 1907, the United States made rapid industrial, 
agricultural, and business sector advances.  Prices rose, beginning in 1903, and hit their peak 
during January 1906.  Once stock prices hit their peak, they began to fall, leading to the “silent 
panic” of March 14th, 1907 (Perkins 161).  During this time there was widespread speculation, 
financiers and business leaders warned that more discretion should be taken during financial 
transactions (Perkins 161).  The public was unaware of the potentially volatile economic 
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conditions.  In December 1906 call money went from nine to fifteen percent; and in January it 
reached fifty percent.  By March 1907 “banks were forced to call loans and securities dropped in 
a single day, Thursday, March 14th, from five to twenty-five points, and the market closed in a 
very demoralized condition” (Perkins 162).  On March 15th, after this situation occurred, bankers 
and financiers saw no real threats of crisis or insolvency in the banking system.  By the summer 
of 1907 the stocks of Amalgamated Copper, United States Steel, and other firms began dropping 
without reason (Perkins 162). This trend of depression continued into August, fears of financial 
crisis became a reality due to the failure of two stock exchange houses.  Due to the imminent 
possibility of a financial crisis, capitalists converted their assets into cash to use later (Perkins 
163).  The foundations have been laid for a financial crisis and panic to ensue in 1907. 
The first major corporation that crashed during the Financial Crisis of 1907 was the 
United Copper Company under the control of F.A. Heinze. Later, Heinze collaborated with 
Charles W. Morse, Orlando F. Thomas, and E.R. Thomas to establish the firm of Otto Heinze & 
Co. (Perkins 163).  Charles W. Morse “was the owner of a ‘chain’ of New York banks, whose 
control he had secured by buying the stock of one bank, hypothecating the shares and with the 
proceeds buying control of another, and then repeating the operation as often as he wished” 
(Perkins 163-4). Morse controlled various banks: National Bank of North America, The New 
Amsterdam National Bank, and The Fourteenth Street Bank.  Additionally, he was the director of 
Mercantile National Bank. The Thomases were involved as officers and directors in other banks, 
specifically the Consolidated National and Oriental.  A financial connection between Morse and 
Heinze, who was also president of the Mercantile National Bank, was established.  When 
Heinze’s United Copper Company collapsed, the depositors of Mercantile National Bank 
withdrew their funds because they knew about the business connection between Heinze and 
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Morse.  As a result, the bank run spread and Mercantile National Bank had trouble meeting its 
Clearing House daily balance requirement.  The Clearing House began to investigate the reason 
for the withdrawals at Mercantile National Bank.  On October 16th, resulting from the Clearing 
House investigations, Heinze was forced to resign as president of the bank.  This was followed 
by the resignations of all the board members, including Morse and the Thomases (Perksins 164).  
A bank run ensued in Manhattan on any bank that had the name Heinze, Morse, or Thomas in its 
board of directors (Perkins 164-5).  On October 20th, a conference was held with various leading 
bankers and the decision was made that Morse, Heinze, the Thomases, and various banking 
speculators “must be eliminated from the directorship of all the banks in the management of 
which they were intimately connected” (Perkins 165).  Similarly, the Clearing House 
investigated the Knickerbocker Trust Company—considered the strongest trust company in New 
York during the time—and was not satisfied with the conditions.  The Clearing House 
investigation was intended to remain secret; however, the results of the visit were made public on 
October 21, and a bank run ensued.  Perkins recounts the run’s affect on the Knickerbocker Trust 
Company: “it seemed impossible that a run so great as to place the Knickerbocker Trust 
Company in jeopardy could be made, as it possessed and turned into cash marketable 
securities…by 11 o’clock the following day it had paid out seven millions of the eight millions it 
had and then closed its doors” (Perkins 165).  The night of October 21, the presidents of the trust 
companies associated with Knickerbocker convened to discuss the ways to prevent the spread of 
the bank run.  However, no solutions came out of the meeting (Perkins 165-6).  Financier J.P. 
Morgan took part in these meetings and stated that the presidents of the trust companies “must 
lay aside their jealousies at once and act together for the common good” to prevent a bank run 
(Perkins 166).  As a solution to the bank run crisis, J.P. Morgan financed the Knickerbocker 
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Trust Company’s low cash supplies (Perkins 166-7).  Perkins argues: “the security of each bank 
and trust company was buttressed with promised aid of all the other financial institution.  There 
were yet the brokerage houses that conducted their business from day to day borrowing from the 
banks on stock collateral” (Perkins 167).  On October 23, brokers could not borrow money at all; 
and, the next day call money was “exhausted in a few minutes,” resulting in the bankruptcy of 
many firms (Perkins 167).  J.P. Morgan was called by the Stock Exchange’s President to prevent 
its closure.  J.P. Morgan’s response to this predicament was “Tell the governors that the 
Exchange must not close. Tell them they will have all the cash necessary within fifteen minutes” 
(Perkins 167).  As a result, J.P. Morgan gave twenty million dollars to these bankers (Perkins 
167). 
The Financial Crisis of 1907 can be simplified to disequilibrium between assets and 
liabilities.  During the 1907 crisis, the world reacted like a businessperson would during a period 
of over speculation and over confidence by committing “itself so deeply to a heavy burden of 
demand liabilities that credit facilities are no longer available” (Noyes 206).  Similar to when a 
firm is in this state, industrial and financial markets will go thorough a period of gradual 
liquidation to restore the equilibrium between assets and liabilities (Noyes 207).  During a 
financial crisis there is a period of “financial distress” after the speculative boom—meaning that 
the banks cannot meet their liabilities.  In the economy as a whole, there is a rush for liquidity 
among speculators to get out of assets and into money, developing inauspicious consequences for 
the prices of commodities. These speculators realize that the market cannot go higher, resulting 
in the withdrawal of assets.  As speculators withdraw, price levels decline and bankruptcies 
increase.  Liquidation occurs, and panic sets in because there is the realization that there not 
enough money for everyone to sell, and “revulsion” occurs—meaning “revulsion against 
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commodities or securities leads banks to cease lending on collateral of such assets” 
(Kindleberger 15).  Financial crises occur when there is speculation, monetary expansion, a rise 
in the prices of assets, followed by a sharp fall, and a rush into money, as exemplified in the 
1907 and 2008 crises (Kindleberger 17). 
Basics of Islamic Finance 
The system of Islamic finance ensures that banking and financial services are Sharia’a 
compliant—adhering to Islamic law and religious practices.  Specifically, Sharia’a compliant 
banking prohibits interest (Kettell viii). Instead of charging interest rates, Islamic finance uses a 
system of profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) agreements (Ketell vii).  This situation results in a 
partnership to manage the depositors’ assets between Islamic banks and their depositors, Islamic 
banks and their investment clients (Kettell 4). Sharia’a compliant banking is established on the 
basis that the lender needs to decide if he wants to help the borrower or he wants a share of the 
profit.  If the lender helps the borrower, the principle is secured and he has no claim to an 
additional amount of money.  However, if the lender advances money to share in the borrower’s 
profit, the lender is entitled to a predetermined ratio of profit earned; and must share the loss with 
the borrower, if it is incurred (Usmani 7).  Islamic finance is ultimately governed by “divine 
injunction”—limiting the unregulated profit motives of secular capitalist finance (Usmani 10-1).  
There are a few central principles essential to the functioning of the Islamic financial 
system.  The first is riba, the prohibition of interest on loan repayments.  Riba originates from a 
quotation from an Islamic scholar stating: “the prohibition applies to any advantage or benefits 
that the lender might secure of out the loan such as riding the borrower’s mule, eating at his 
table, or event taking advantage of the shade of his wall” (Kettell 5).  This quotation can be 
interpreted as the benefits the lender cannot receive benefits for the services they provide 
Walton 11	  
because it is an unequal distribution of effort between both parties.  Interest in Islamic finance is 
prohibited because it creates an unequal distribution of justice and opportunities and a loan is 
considered to be a charitable action (Usmani 11; Salah 509).  Instead, contracting parties in 
Islamic financial systems profit through the use of profit-and-loss sharing contracts which creates 
a fair and just distribution of participating in the resultant profit from investment (Salah 509).   
Profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contracts are crucial to the Islam finance system.  In 
Sharia’a compliant banking, lenders must invest and become business partners with their 
borrows to share in profit and risk, meaning everyone partakers in the outcomes—profitable or 
not—of financial transactions (Kettell 5).  PLS requires banks to focus on productivity instead of 
creditworthiness, resulting in profiting on investments only when they are successful (Kettell 6).  
PLS contracts are related to the Islamic idea that money has no intrinsic value—one cannot make 
money out of money (Kettell 7; Salah 509).  Money is a medium of exchange: its purpose is to 
determine the value of a good or service.  It cannot function to generate more money through the 
use of interest rate payments.  As a result, in Islamic finance, assets must back all financial 
transactions.  Muslim jurists assert that money has the potential to be capital and it is considered 
capital only when it is invested in business (Kettell 7).   
Additionally, Islamic finance prohibits uncertainty, risk and financial speculation (Kettell 
7).  The prohibition of uncertainty is known as gharar (Salah 509). During financial transactions, 
contracting parties should have knowledge of the goods received and/or the prices paid before 
entering the contract (Ketell 7).  In Islamic finance, a financial contract should have specific 
terms relating to the “sale, price, deliverability, quantity, quality, existence, etc.” of the goods 
and services (Salah 509).  Also, vague and misleading terms in contracts are prohibited because 
they promote uncertainty about the financial transaction.  Contracts should be transparent.  
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Contracting parties must be cognizant and have advanced knowledge of all aspects of the 
financial transaction.  Gharar is prohibited because it promotes injustice and inequality for one 
of the parties during the financial transaction due to lack of information disclosed.  Likewise, 
Islamic finance forbids financial speculation, or Qimar.  Speculation occurs when “two or more 
parties each undertake the risk of a loss where a loss for one means the gain for the other” (Salah 
509).  Under the tenets of Islamic finance, speculation is banned because there is the possibility 
of effortless profit creation (Salah 509). The main principle behind the prohibiting speculation 
and financial uncertainty is to prevent the immoral exploitation of the weak and lower classes 
(Kettell 7).  
Another idea central to Islamic finance is only Sharia’a approved contacts are 
permissible.  Islam regulates all aspects of life, including business and commerce.  As a result, 
Islamic banks cannot finance businesses that “conflict with the moral value of Islam” (Kettell 8).  
It is prohibited (haram) for Islamic financial institutions to finance and invest in businesses 
relating to “alcohol, pork, armaments, military technology, pornography, prostitution and 
gambling” or activities that harm society (Salah 508; Kettell 8).  Moreover, in Islamic finance 
there must be sanctity of contracts.  There is a moral obligation of Muslims to conduct their 
business activities in accordance with Islam, meaning being “honest, fair, and just towards 
others” (Kettell 8).  In order for a financial transaction to be Sharia’a compliant, it must occur 
under a legal system, meaning there must be a contract.  The Qur’an promotes the idea of a 
binding commercial contract made in good faith (Salah 508).  These principles are central to the 
functioning of Sharia’a compliant financial transactions.  
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Prohibition of Interest (Riba) 
The probation of interest (riba) is central to the Islamic financial system.  The meaning of 
riba in Arabic is an excess or increase.  Riba is described as “a loan with the condition that the 
borrower will return to the lender more than the amount borrowed” (Kettell 13).  In accordance 
with their religious beliefs, Muslims must avoid riba during financial transactions.  The Prophet 
Mohammad warns that the institution of riba will become so ubiquitous and unavoidable for 
Muslims.  According to the Qur’an, interest is prohibited (haram) for Muslims because “Allah 
has declared war on the usurer” (Kettell 15).  As a result of the prohibition of interest, Muslims 
are urged to provide for their families using Sharia’a compliant methods (Kettell 15). 
Islamic scholars have theoretically reconciled the prohibition of interest (riba) with 
“morality and economics” (Kettell 16).  According to Sharia’a law, riba is morally unjust 
(zulm).  Islamic scholars argue that interest based contracts is unfair to one of the contracting 
parties, either the borrower or the lender.  A financial contract with interest may be considered to 
be unfair to the borrower because the transaction can either incur a profit or a loss.  In the event 
of the borrower suffering a financial loss, he will not receive a return for his inputs of time and 
work, and is required to pay interest and capital to the lender.  Despite the borrower’s financial 
loss, the lender must get paid interest.  As a result of this situation described, Islamic scholars 
declare riba unjust.  Additionally, the Prophet Mohammad and the Qur’an address the riba as 
being unjust.  Kettell maintains: “punishing someone for default is unjust; an it should be a judge 
who decides what any compensation should be for a default, not the party to whom the debt is 
owed” (Kettell 18).  In addition, the institution of riba is seen to corrupt society (fasad).  As 
inferred from passages in the Qur’an, charging interest is considered to be fasad.  In Sharia’a 
compliant finance, charging interest suggests the unlawful appropriation of an individual’s 
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property.  In the Qur’an, Jews are reprimanded for taking usury when it is prohibited and taking 
an individual’s wealth by false pretenses.  Further, riba is linked to hoarding and some Muslims 
equate it to murder (Kettell 19).  Clearly, the Qur’an denounces charging interest because it is 
viewed as immoral and corrupts society (Kettell 19).  Also, riba has a negative effect on 
financial growth.  The Qur’an implies that “riba is subject to destruction (mahq)”—a continuous 
decrease (Kettell 20).  This notion is contradictory to the common meaning of interest: by 
charging interest one increases one’s financial wealth.  Riba is thought to negatively affect one’s 
social wealth because it fails to stimulate growth of social wealth and allows for the inefficient 
allocation of societal resources.  In a traditional Western interest based financial system, the 
distribution of credit is based on the creditworthiness of the borrower.  However, in Sharia’a 
compliant finance, resource allocation is deemed more efficient than creditworthiness because 
the productivity of a project is more important.  This theory causes finance to be put toward more 
productive projects.  Lastly, Islamic scholars assert that charging interest “demeans and 
diminishes human personality” (Kettell 21).  Therefore, charging interest violates natural social 
interaction that requires cooperation between parties.  The prohibition of interest has moral and 
economic grounds in the Islamic financial system. 
How Do Islamic Banks Profit If They Cannot Charge Interest? 
The pressing issue with Sharia’a compliant finance is how do Islamic banks profit if 
charging interest is prohibited? There is a simple solution.  Kettell asserts: “Islamic banks use 
Sharia’a complaint contracts with do not permit interest to be charged but do encourage trade 
and investment via alternative financing mechanisms” (Kettell 23).  The alternative financing 
mechanisms of Islamic finance are divided into two groups: Islamically permissible deferred 
sales contracts and profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contracts.  In Islamically-permissible deferred 
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sales contracts, Muslim jurists ruled that it is reasonable to immediately sell a good with a 
deferred price greater than its cash price, which can potentially be paid in installments.  The 
reasoning behind this ruling is that the seller is sacrificing benefits to make a good available to 
an individual buying it with a deferred payment.  The price increase of the good is viewed as 
compensation to the seller because of the buyer’s installment payments.  Muslim jurists have 
justified these transactions considering the contract is independently specified and includes no 
ignorance (jahala).  There are four types of deferred sales contracts: Murabaha, Salam, 
Istinsna’a, and Ijara (Kettell 24).  In this paper, I will be focusing on Murabaha, sale with a 
known profit (See appendix).  The second Islamically-permissible mode of finance is profit-and-
loss sharing (PLS) contracts, meaning the “outcome is sharing based and cannot be 
predetermined” (Kettell 25).  By using profit-and-loss sharing contracts, shareholders can only 
be repaid if the business venture makes a profit.  There are two types of profit-and-loss sharing 
contracts: Mudaraha and Musharaka, both sharing profits and losses between contracting parties 
(Kettell 25).  
The Islamic financial instrument sukuk or Islamic bonds create investment contracts in 
Islamic finance.  The Sharia’a board, AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions), defines sukuk as: “certificates of equal value representing 
undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) 
the assets of particular projects or special investment activity” (Salah 510).  Special investment 
activity addresses the use of musharaka and mudaraba contracts (See Appendix).  The profit-
and-loss sharing partnership legally states that contracting parties own all tangible assets in the 
partnership.  As a result, “shares in partnership are regarded as assets that can be securitized 
through a sukuk issuance” (Salah 510).  The sukuk is based on the mudaraba contract, forbidding 
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the use of interest rates (Salah 510; Economist 82).  A sukuk is structured when the contracting 
party that needs financing, the originator, establishes a special-purpose-vehicle (SPV) as a part of 
their financial contract, to facilitate investment and generate cash from assets (Salah 510; 
Economist 82).  To facilitate the SPV, the originator participates in a mudaraba contract with 
many capital market investors.  In this arrangement, the originator acts like the mudarib 
(entrepreneur) and the SPV as the rab al-maal (investor).  The SPV receives financing for the 
capital investments for the mudaraba contract by issuing sukuk certificates—giving the holder of 
sukuk a “beneficial right in the interest and rights to the assets of the mudaraba: the SPV will 
declare a trust over all its assets and rights under agreements entered in with the originator in 
favor of the sukuk holders” (Salah 510).  The holders of sukuk are the beneficiaries of the SPV 
under the mudaraba contract and are entitled to the profits generated, resulting in the SPV 
paying profits to the sukuk holders.  The payments made by the SPV are not fixed.  Instead, they 
rely on the performance of the mudaraba financial venture.  These payments by the SPV are 
made until the sukuk’s maturity date.  When the sukuk matures, the originator buys the SPV 
shares in the mudaraba.  Lastly, the SPV pays the “purchase price to the sukuk holders, after 
which the sukuk will be redeemed” (Salah 510).  The sukuk is considered to be Sharia’a 
compliant because there is no interest paid and the payments made rely on the performance of 
the mudaraba venture (Salah 510). 
Can a Financial Crisis Occur if Islamic Regulations are in Force? 
A financial crisis similar to 1907 could occur if Islamic financial regulations were in 
force.   A central banking mechanism is key to prevent asset levels from falling, in both capitalist 
and Islamic financial systems.  During the 1907 crisis, the Federal Reserve had not yet come into 
existence.  There were no financial institutions during this era that could monitor the expansion 
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of business, as a result of speculation, to prevent an eventual financial collapse.  Therefore, J.P. 
Morgan acted in absence of the central banking mechanism—providing financing and calling 
meetings between the New York bankers, to alleviate the crisis.  In the modern capitalist banking 
systems, a central bank tries to prevent and reduce the effects of panics and financial crises.  
Despite the lack of interest rates in Islamic financial systems, financial crises can still occur.  The 
severity of a financial crisis depends upon the strength of the country’s central banking 
mechanism, in its attempt to promote stability and financial regulation.  I will examine the cases 
of financial crises in Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Qatar to show that financial crises can 
occur in countries that follow the Islamic banking system.  However, Dubai suffered a greater 
financial crisis due to poor regulation by its central bank.  Qatar was able to survive and thrive 
during a financial downturn as a result of its strong central banking regulations. 
The Financial Crisis in Dubai, United Arab Emirates 
 Dubai is recognized throughout the world for its extravagant and luxurious real estate and 
infrastructure.  Despite its service and tourism based economy, it was vulnerable to financial 
crisis because its housing market was affected by the 2008 global financial crisis (Zembowicz 
12).  Prior to the global financial crisis, there was a period of high economic growth with easy 
access to borrowing and credit. This unrestricted availability of cheap borrowing and credit lead 
to high investment and consumption.  In addition, high oil prices facilitated increased wealth and 
capital growth (Brach and Loewe 45).  The 2008 Financial Crisis ended up having a limited 
effect on Arab countries, despite the crisis in Dubai occurring simultaneously (Brach and Loewe 
51).  At the beginning of the financial crisis Dubai’s national debt was US $80 billion, putting it 
in a better position than most Arab states with oil-based economies.  Dubai’s economy was not 
effected by the decrease in oil prices and revenue only about 3 percent of its GDP comes from 
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the oil industry (Zembowicz 10) The financial crisis in Dubai transpired as a result of internal 
economic problems, not the global economic crisis.  Dubai’s government tried to diversify its 
economy to make it the center of the Middle East for high-end tourism, financial services, and 
transportation.  As a result, the Emir of Dubai instituted construction companies to begin 
building new infrastructure “such as Port Dubai, the skyscraper Burj Dubai, Nakheel Island, 
World Island, and the unfinished Dynamic Tower” (Brach and Loewe 54).  Consequently, the 
increased construction of infrastructure lead to Dubai turning into one of the world’s largest 
construction sites.  The high demand for construction in Dubai resulted in an increase in property 
prices (Brach and Loewe 54).  During the period of economic growth before the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, Dubai reaped the advantages of the high availability of cheap credit and investors with 
high market expectations from the global economic upswing (Brach and Loewe 54). 
 In addition, Dubai’s housing market was greatly affected by the global economic crisis 
because it is directly connected to international investors (Zembowicz 12-3). Dubai was the first 
Arab state to allow international investors to purchase land.  International investors—who left 
economic stagnation in the home countries—in Dubai constitute about four-fifths of the 
emirate’s population.  As the global financial crisis progressed, these international investors’ 
dispensable income decreased—shrinking the amount of money that flowed into Dubai’s 
economy.  Likewise, as the state-owned firms, such as Al-Nakheel, began downsizing their labor 
force as financial crisis hit, laying off their mostly foreign construction workers.  Consequently, 
Dubai’s Ministry of Labor started cancelling about 1,500 work visas per day (Zembowicz 13).  
These conditions in Dubai’s economy put it on the trajectory toward financial crisis.  
However, in early 2008, investors became weary of Dubai’s development and economy 
as a result of stagnating property prices.  The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 aided Dubai’s 
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economic slump: foreign investors began to withdraw their money from Dubai to pay for their 
losses elsewhere due to the global financial crisis.  Construction companies in Dubai began to 
collapse and eventually stop working on projects because they had very little assets left in their 
liquidity reserves.  Dubai World, a state-owned investment company, took over the bankrupt Al-
Nakheel company, a real estate developer, and many development projected ceased.  In 
November 2009, Dubai’s financial situation worsened, as other Arab countries began to 
overcome the global financial crisis because the government revealed that state-owned Dubai 
world and Al-Nakheel faced liquidity problems and requested debt payment rescheduling until 
May 2010.  This revelation had dramatic effects on the stock market, already in a state of decline 
(Brach and Loewe 54).  Foreign banks and investors had significant amounts of money invested 
into Dubai.  If Dubai defaulted on its debts, these foreign banks and investors would incur huge 
losses (Balasubramanian 10). The Emirate of Abu Dhabi realized that Dubai’s debt payment 
rescheduling had affected the creditworthiness, stock market indices, and credit rating of the 
Gulf states, and as result provided financial assistance via conditional bailouts (Brach and Loewe 
54; Balasubramanian 10).  Dubai’s financial crisis was ultimately the culmination of increased 
speculation real estate markets that occurred during the global financial crisis in 2008. 
As Dubai faced financial and real estate crisis, its status in the international financial 
system as a Middle Eastern symbol of prosperity has declined.  For Dubai to achieve sustained 
economic prosperity, it needs to diversify its economy in order to become the cultural and 
financial center of the Middle East.  Dubai’s service and real estate based economy prospered 
during the period of economic boom before the global financial crisis.  The sudden decrease in 
real estate pries and resultant excess supply and low demand of property, lead to the downfall of 
Dubai’s economy.  Economic diversification could have helped mitigate the severity of the 
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financial crisis because “risk management warns against putting all of an economy’s eggs in one 
basket” (Balasubramanian 10).  The United Arab Emirates’ central bank has established a 
liquidity scheme to help Dubai complete its short-term debt obligations.  This scheme has helped 
reduce the effect of Dubai’s economic crisis on the global economy.  However, for Dubai to 
completely recover, it needs to establish a diversified economy to achieve its goal to become the 
cultural and financial center of the Middle East (Balasubramanian 11).  
The financial crisis in Dubai is considered to be a test of Islamic finance.  Many of the 
loans and bonds issued by Dubai World, the state owned investment firm, are considered to be 
Sharia’a compliant. Dubai world asked to delay its repayment on its $59 billion debt, creating 
legal problems for Dubai World’s investors (Timmons). Also, Dubai’s debt issues affected sukuk 
investors, issued by Al-Nakheel.  A debt restructuring deal made sure that Al-Nakheel’s sukuk 
bondholders would be repaid on schedule.  However this situation has lead to decreased 
confidence in this investment system (Economist 82).  According to director general of Dubai’s 
finance department, Abdulrahman al-Saleh, the government does not guarantee Dubai World’s 
debt, and that lenders should “bear some of the responsibility” (Timmons).  Since Sharia’a 
compliant finance creates a partnership between lenders and borrowers, through profit-and-loss 
sharing contracts, as a result of the prohibition of interest rates, there is confusion about who gets 
repaid first when a firm defaults on its debt.  There is no legal precedent on who will get repaid 
first in the event of a major firm, such as Dubai World, defaulting on their debt (Timmons).  
There is much uncertainty surrounding the possibility of an Islamic financial default due to the 
issues of enforceability and “Sharia’a risk” (Economist 82).  First, many sukuk contracts under 
the English law system and govern assets in the Gulf region.  The question is which system of 
jurisprudence is enforced regarding the potential default of these Islamic firms.  Secondly, there 
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is the issue of Sharia’a compliance.  Some have argued that these financial transactions and 
instruments are not Sharia’a compliant because they involve an element of risk—prohibited by 
Sharia’a.  In Dubai, there was a misuse of Islamic financial instruments creating a situation 
where Dubai’s state-owned firms generated more debt than they could handle (Economist).   
There is debate on whether the Islamic financial instruments, sukuk, are actually Sharia’a 
compliant.  According to the United Arab Emirates’ Central Bank’s Federal Law No. 6 of 1985: 
“Islamic banks, financial institutions and investment companies shall mean those whose articles 
and memorandums of association include a commitment to abide by the provisions of the Islamic 
Sharia’h Law” (Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates 1).  In other words, all financial 
transactions must be Sharia’a compliant.  Scholars have debated the sukuk’s Sharia’a 
compliance.  Chairman of the AAOIFI (Shari’ah Board of the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions), Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani argues that the 
sukuk is not Sharia’a compliant because they violate the prohibition of interest and equally 
shared risk.  Despite the Islamic prohibition of interest, the sukuk is sold to investors, Muslim or 
not, based on interest rates.  Marketing asset-based returns by using interest rates is considered to 
be corrupt by Usmani.  Usmani states: “the time has come to revisit this matter, and rid sukuk of 
these blemishes” (Black 44).  Also, there is a problem of the allocation of risk.  Usmani argues 
that the mudarib often agrees upon the sukuk maturity to buy back the original asset shares.  
Thus, the sukuk acts like a conventional bond, lowering the amount of risk taken by the investor 
(Black 44).  The lowered investment risk created by sukuk issuance is not Sharia’a compliant 
because the contracting parties do not equally share risk.  
The United Arab Emirates’ Central Bank was not vigilant enough in preventing financial 
crisis through regulation.  The real speculation that occurred during the real estate boom in Dubai 
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was not regulated by the central bank.  This is problematic because Islamic finance prohibits 
financial speculation.  In addition, the issuance of sukuk to promote investment in companies 
such as Dubai World and Al-Nakheel debated to be Sharia’a compliant.  This is troublesome 
since according to United Arab Emirates’ Central Bank law, all contracts must be Sharia’a 
compliant and adherent to the regulations of Islamic finance.  If sukuk issuance is debated by the 
chairman of the AAOIFI, one of the leading sources of Sharia’a compliance standards for the 
Islamic finance industry, then it should violate the UAE’s central bank law.  The case of the 
financial crisis in Dubai illustrates that the lack of central bank regulation on speculation and 
investment in the real estate market contributed the financial crisis, not the adherence of to 
Islamic finance.   
Qatar: Proof That a Central Bank Can Limit the Effects of Financial Crisis 
 Despite the global financial crisis that occurred in 2008, Qatar’s economy grew 11 
percent, unlike its Gulf neighbors: “real GDP in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates contracted by 1.6%, 0.9% and 0.2%, respectively” (Siddiqi 36).  In the financial year 
2009-2010, development spending increased by 15 percent, under Qatar’s expansionary fiscal 
policy.  The government invested in public works projects to promote economic growth.  The 
Qatari government’s economic intervention cost about 6 percent of their GDP though “purchases 
of the equity investment and real estate portfolios of commercial banks—has improved liquidity, 
maintained credit to private businesses and enhanced the system’s resilience” (Siddiqi 36).  The 
economic crisis in neighboring Dubai had a minimal impact on Qatar because of their strong 
banking regulations (Siddiqi 36).  In addition, Qatar has been survived and thrived during the 
global economic crisis due to its diverse and sustainable economy based on petrodollars and 
domestic and international financial assets.  Qatar is situated on the world’s largest gas field, 
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producing about 32 million tons of natural gas per year.  It has the potential for becoming the 
world’s largest gas producer in the future.  Moreover, Qatar has been invested in industries 
unrelated to hydrocarbons such as infrastructure, transportation, and construction. Likewise, 
Qatar’s economy was not hit as hard by the financial crisis because it does not have a strong 
exposure to foreign markets, such as the EU or US.  Qatar’s neighboring GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) states are more dependent on these foreign markets, which has made them more 
susceptible to crisis.  As a response to the global financial crisis, the Qatar Investment Authority 
(QIA) bought a 20 percent share in all banks, a government effort to prevent financial instability 
and crisis. (Gad 46).  
 The Qatar Central Bank, an adherent of Islamic finance, has an active role in promoting 
financial stability.  The Qatar Central Bank’s policy on financial stability is to prevent the system 
from being exposed to unacceptable risk levels through regulation and supervision and promptly 
contain financial crisis by monitoring the solvency of financial institutions.  In addition, the 
Qatar Central Bank set financing controls and oversight for real estate, investment (including 
sukuk), and credit (Qatar Central Banks).  These financial controls and oversight helped in the 
prevention of the spread of financial crisis.  A strong central bank is elemental in preventing 
exacerbated financial crisis as a result of regulatory mechanisms. 
 While under the rules of Islamic finance, the Qatari government was able to prevent the 
spread of the global economic crisis due to its government diversification in industry, lack of 
dependence on foreign markets, and a presence of a strong central bank with regulatory controls.  
Qatar is not dependent on one industry as a main source of revenue, like Dubai.  Depending on 
one industry as a main source of revenue can be problematic because if that industry declines, 
then that country’s economy will be in financial difficultly and face a potential financial crisis.  
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Having multiple investments can safeguard against that scenario from occurring and ruining an 
economy.  Qatar’s lack of dependence on foreign markets compared to other states in the Gulf 
region promotes its financial stability during the time of crisis.  It is not as dependent on the EU 
or US as Dubai.  Dubai’s dependence on foreign investment and business, lead to its demise 
during the financial crisis because these investors could not pay on their investments in Dubai as 
a result of financial crisis at home.  This issue is not a problem in Qatar, resulting in their ability 
to survive and thrive during the financial crisis.  Lastly, the Qatar Central Bank has strong 
financial regulations governing investment, finance, and business dealings.  Qatar Central Bank 
enforces the regulations of Islamic finance that eschew interest rates and prohibits speculation, 
risk, and uncertainty.  The enforcement of the regulations of Islamic finance in Dubai is 
questionable due to the debate of the Sharia’a compliance of the sukuk.  The strength of the 
central bank in Qatar, in combination with their strict financial regulations, prevented the 
occurrence of a severe financial crisis.  
Characteristics of 1907, Dubai, and Qatar Crises 
 I will provide a comparison of the characteristics of 1907, Dubai, and Qatar cases. First, I 
will address pre-crisis conditions that lead to the imminent financial crisis.  Then, I will explain 
the crisis conditions that occurred during the financial crisis. Lastly, I will focus on the presence 
of a central banking mechanism and lender of last resort in each case (See Table A).  
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Table A: 1907, Dubai, and Qatar Crisis Characteristics 
 1907 Dubai Qatar 
Pre-crisis 
Conditions 
Increases in gold supply, 
bank credit, commodity 
prices, and interest rates.  
 
Unmonitored economic 
prosperity and stock boom. 
Speculative financial 
climate.   
Increased economic 
growth. 
 
Easy and unrestricted 
access to borrowing and 
lending credit. 
 
Increase in property 
market. 
 
High economic 
expectation and 
speculation in real estate 
market.  
Increased economic 
growth rate. 
 
Non-speculative 
financial climate. 
 
Diversified market based 
on oil market and other 
sectors. 
 
Monitored economic 
growth through 
government 
involvement.  
Crisis 
Conditions 
Decline in cash reserves.  
 
Cessation in lending.  
 
Stocks peaked and then 
dropped, resulting in a bank 
run. 
 
Firms went bankrupt due to 
low cash supplies.  
Stagnating property 
prices. 
 
Withdrawal of foreign 
investment as a result of 
2008 crisis.  
 
Lack of foreign 
investment causes real 
estate development to 
cease. 
 
The possibility of 
default and request for 
debt payment 
rescheduling causes a 
lack of creditworthiness.  
 
Government invested in 
public works projects to 
promote economic 
growth during 2008 
crisis.  
 
Qatar Investment 
Authority bought a 20 
percent share in all 
banks as an effort to 
prevent crisis and 
instability.  
Central 
Banking 
Mechanism 
and Lender of 
Last Resort 
In the absence of a central 
banking mechanism, J.P. 
Morgan acts as lender of 
last resort. 
United Arab Emirates 
Central Bank did not 
fully enforce the rules of 
Islamic finance, 
prohibiting speculation 
and uncertainty. 
 
The Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi acts as a lender of 
last resort by providing 
conditional bailouts.  
The Qatar Central Bank 
has strict financial 
regulations in place to 
prevent and mitigate the 
effects of financial crisis 
and instability as per the 
rules of Islamic finance.  
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 The cases of the 1907 and Dubai crises have many similarities.  The pre-crisis conditions 
in both cases depict an environment of increased and unrestricted economic prosperity in a 
speculative financial climate.  Additionally, in the 1907 and Dubai crisis cases there were similar 
crisis conditions: both consisted of a cessation in lending as a result of low case supplies.  Lastly, 
there is a lack of a strong central banking mechanism in each case.  In 1907, a central banking 
mechanism was non-existent because the Federal Reserve was not established until 1913.  In the 
case of Dubai, the United Arab Emirates Central Bank did not fully enforce Islamic financial 
regulations that prohibit speculation and uncertainty, that could possibly prevent or mitigate the 
occurrence of a financial crisis.  The 1907 and Dubai cases both end with the entrance of a lender 
of last resort.  In 1907, J.P. Morgan acts as the lender of last resort by giving 20 million dollars to 
the Stock Exchange to prevent its closure.  In the Dubai case, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi provides 
conditional bailouts to Dubai because their crisis is affecting the creditworthiness of the other 
emirates.  The similar circumstances between the 1907 and Dubai case illustrate that a financial 
crisis can occur under the rules of Islamic finance.  The Qatari case, however, illustrates that a 
crisis can be prevented and mitigated due to the strong financial regulations of a central banking 
mechanism.  The Qatar Central Bank took steps through the 2008 crisis to prevent internal crisis 
and financial instability.  Qatar’s strict adherence to the Islamic financial rules of prohibited 
speculation and uncertainty in financial transactions played a role in preventing and mitigating 
the effects of the financial crisis.   
Conclusion 
 As depicted in 1907, a financial crisis occurs when there is an absence of a central banking 
mechanism that prevents speculation and promotes economic stability.  Financial crises occur 
when there is speculation and monetary expansion, rising asset prices and followed by a sharp 
Walton 27	  
fall (Kindleberger 17).  A financial crisis similar to 1907 can occur if Islamic financial 
regulations are in force.  The prevention and mitigaion of a financial crisis similar to 1907 is 
mainly dependent on the strength of the central bank in enforcing regulations that prevent 
rampant speculation.  In the case of Dubai, the United Arab Emirates Central Bank did not 
strictly enforce the Islamic financial rules and regulations that could have prevented or mitigated 
the financial crisis.  There was speculation and uncertainty in Dubai’s real estate market that 
contributed to the financial crisis.  In addition, the use of the sukuk as a method of investment in 
Dubai also is problematic: they are not purely Sharia’a compliant because their performance is 
uncertain and involve financial risk to be taken.  However, in Qatar, the central bank was able to 
survive and thrive during a time of global economic crisis due to its banking regulations and 
adherence to the tenets of Islamic finance, eschewing interest rates, risk, and uncertainty in 
financial transactions and contracts.  Based on my findings, I conclude that a financial crisis can 
occur under the tenets of Islamic finance and the financial regulations of a central banking 
mechanism can prevent or mitigate the a financial crisis.  
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Appendix: Modes of Islamic Finance 
As a mode of Islamic finance, Murabaha contracts refer to a sale of a good with a 
predetermined profit mark-up on the cost.  The basis of Murabaha is that the seller reveals the 
actual cost of acquiring the goods to the buyer, and then adds a profit mark-up.  There are four 
components of the Murabaha contract.  First, a prospective buyer makes an order to the seller to 
purchase a specific commodity or good for a profit.  According to Sharia’a scholars, the order to 
buy a commodity from a seller is viewed as an invitation to do business, not necessarily a 
commitment.  Secondly, after accepting the invitation, the seller is obligated to verify that he can 
locate the commodity, meaning buying and owning it through a legitimate contract.  Third, the 
seller makes an offer to the prospective buyer after it has been bought and owned by the seller.  
Lastly, the prospective buyer can buy the commodity or renege on the promise.  When the 
prospective buyer agrees to buy the commodity a Murabaha contract is established (Kettell 26-
7).  The Murabaha contract is considered to be Sharia’a compliant because Islam suggests that 
money and commodities have different characteristics and therefore should be treated differently 
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(Kettell 28).  Money has no intrinsic value and is only considered a medium of exchange, and is 
different than a commodity (Kettell 29).  Murabaha contracts are used for the following financial 
transactions in society: “mortgages, working capital, syndicated credit, GSM licenses, letters of 
credit, and car purchases” (Kettell 32).   
Another mode of Islamic finance is Mudaraba, a type of profit-and-loss sharing finance, 
a “partnership between capital and work, conducted between investment account holders, owners 
of capital and the Islamic bank as an entrepreneur (Mudarib)” (Kettell 36).  The buyer and seller 
mutually determine the allocation of profits in the context of the business transaction.  Kettell 
maintains: “the profit is shared in pre-agreed ratios, and any loss, unless caused by negligence or 
violation of terms of the contract by the Mudarib, is borne by the Islamic bank.  The bank passes 
on this loss to the bank depositors, known as investment account holders” (Kettell 37).  A 
Mudaraba contract is technically a profit sharing contract because there is no loss sharing.  In the 
event of a loss, the capital owner takes responsibility for the loss and the agent sacrifices the 
reward of his effort.  Moreover, Islamic financiers have redefined the Mudaraba as the “Two-tier 
Mudaraba,” meaning that the contracts are expanded to include three parties: “depositors as 
financiers, the bank as an intermediary, and the entrepreneur who requires funds” (Kettell 38).  
The Mudaraba contract is considered to be Sharia’a compliant because it “means ‘journey 
through the earth seeking the bounty of Allah.’ Because of his work and travel, the Mudarib 
becomes entitled to part of the profits of the venture” (Kettell 41).  Mudaraba contracts are 
essential to Islamic finance because it is used with businesses seeking finance, such as doctors, 
dentists, engineers, traders, etc.  In a Mudaraba contract, “the bank provides the necessary 
finance as a capital owner in exchange for a share in the profit to be agreed upon” (Kettell 43).  
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Lastly, it is necessary for precautions to be taken in Mudaraba contracts to decrease risk because 
the lender bears all responsibility in the event of a loss (Kettell 43). 
Another type of profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contract is Musharaka.  The Musharaka 
contract is a partnership where two or more individuals combine capital and/or labor, sharing in 
profits, rights, and liabilities (Kettell 46-7).  This business partnership can take the form of a 
mufawada—an unrestricted partnership with equal rights of capital and management between the 
contracting parties.  Both partners share profit and loss of the business venture in Musharaka 
contracts.  There is no a guaranteed rate of return on the investment, unlike when interest is 
charged in Western financial transactions.  The income earned during the business venture under 
Musharaka contracts can possibly result in losses for the joint business enterprises (Kettell 47). 
Musharaka contracts are primarily used for house purchase, service sector applications, small 
business applications, and commercial and real estate applications (Kettell 51-2).   
 
